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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER SECTION 22(d)
OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACTt
SCOTT HODES*
For the time being, at least, Section 22(d) of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 19401
 (1940 Act) is alive and well. However, some diag-
noses reveal that the section may be experiencing the effects of regula-
tory overexertion and legislative fatigue. Section 22 (d) was enacted to
require a registered investment company, its principal underwriter or
a dealer in its shares to sell such shares to any person (except a dealer)
only at a current offering price described in the fund's prospectus. The
provision, which effectively prevents any price competition among
dealers selling the shares of a particular fund, was adopted in order
to insure the orderly distribution of fund shares and to prevent dis-
crimination among purchasers of such shares. The anticompetitive
aspects of section 22(d), however, have • become so controversial that
during recent congressional hearings some legislators advocated its
repeal; 2
 others recommended amending it to give the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) jurisdiction over the magnitude of the
sales loads charged; while still others proposed that section 22(d)
should not be changed until the implications of any proposal for change
had been studied in depth.4 The conservatives emerged victorious in
t This article was completed on March 1, 1972.
* A.B., University of Chicago, 1956; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1959; LL.M.,
Northwestern University, 1963; member, Arvey, Hodes & Mantynband, Chicago, Illinois,
1 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970). Section 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22d (1970)
provides:
(d) No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued
by it to any person except to or through a principal underwriter for distri-
bution or at a current public offering price described in the prospectus, and, if
such class of security is being currently offered to the public by or through an
underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer shall sell any
such security to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer,
except at a current public offering price described in the prospectus. Nothing in
this subsection shall prevent a sale made (i) pursuant to an offer of exchange per-
mitted by section 80a-11 of this title including any offer made pursuant to section
80a-11(h) of this title; (ii) pursuant to an offer made solely to all registered
holders of the securities, or of a particular class or series of securities issued by the
company proportionate to their holdings or proportionate to any cash distribution
made to them by the company (subject to appropriate qualifications designed
solely to avoid issuance of fractional securities); or (fil) in accordance with rules
and regulations of the Commission made pursuant to subsection (b) of section
80a-12 of this title.
2 S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. f 12(a) (1969).
' 8 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(c) (1969).
4
 After extensive bearings on S. 296 and S. 34, a "clean" bill (S. 2224) was reported
to the Senate. S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. { 12(c) (1969).
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the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 5 and section 22(d)
remained untouched—although perhaps slightly tarnished.
The genesis of section 22(d) of the 1940 Act has been well charted
in other law review articles and a summary is presented here only as
an introduction to discussion of current regulatory and legislative de-
velopments.° As the reader proceeds it should become apparent to him
that congressional advocates of conflicting interests within the mutual
fund industry continue to weigh the future of section 22 (d). For the
present, no one interest has been able to tip the scale and the ultimate
fate of section 22(d) hangs in balance.
I. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1940
Prior to enactment of the 1940 Act, open-end investment com-
pany shares were distributed by two networks of dealers. One network
was composed of "contract" dealers, those who had entered into con-
tracts with investment companies to offer the latter's shares to the
public at an established offering price. The other network was com-
posed of noncontract dealers, those who were under no contractual
obligation to sell investment company shares at the specified public
offering price. As a consequence, the noncontract dealers were able to
trade fund shares for their own account by purchasing shares from
other noncontract dealers or from public shareholders at a price some-
what higher than the authorized redemption price, and then offering
them for sale at a price somewhat lower than the published sales price
being charged by contract dealers. This technique permitted noncon-
tract dealers to undercut the prices of shares offered by the contract
dealers while allowing them to retain substantial selling commissions.'
The resulting disruption in the distribution and pricing systems of the
investment companies caused many contract dealers, who were pro-
hibited from trading in the above fashion, to cancel their contracts
with principal underwriters. It soon became apparent to the industry
that, if restrictions were not imposed on noncontract dealers, the fund
6 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 [hereinafter cited as 1970 Act].
The legislative history of the 1970 Act is discussed in detail in North, The Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970, 46 Notre Dame Lawyer 712 (1971), which is a
sequel to North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 Notre
Dame Lawyer 677 (1969).
6 See Greene, The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 37 U. Det. L.J. 369 (1960) ; Simpson and Hodes, The
Continuing Controversy Surrounding the Uniform Price Maintenance Provision of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 718 (1969) ; The Mutual
Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 732, 833-51 (1969).
7 SEC, Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies pt. 3, at 850-64
(1940).
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industry would be in the untenable situation of having redemptions
exceed sales. 8
As noted, in promulgating section 22(d), Congress sought to
eliminate discrimination among purchasers by requiring that mutual
fund shares be sold to the public at the offering price described in the
prospectus.° Although this approach is vulnerable to the charge that it
sanctions protective pricing practices, its underlying rationale is con-
sistent with a competing national policy set forth in the Declaration of
Policy of the Investment Company Act:
[T]he national public interest and the interest of investors
are adversely affected—
•	 •	 •
(3) when investment companies issue securities con-
taining inequitable or discriminatory provisions, or
fail to protect the preferences and privileges of the
holders of their outstanding securities. . .
After the passage of 22(d), an interpretative release issued by the
General Counsel of the SEC indicated that section 22(d) required
that sales charges be specifically set forth in the prospectus. The re-
lease further indicated that a single investment was entitled to a
volume discount if it was based on a nondiscriminatory uniform scale
of sales loads charged to all purchasers." According to the release,
8 Since by statute a mutual fund is required to redeem any security it has issued,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1970), it is important that sales always exceed redemptions lest
the company be required to liquidate its holdings to pay for the tendered shares. The
cancelling of contracts by contract dealers, or, in fact, any disruption in the distribution
process, is likely to cause a decline in sales and thus risk the possibility that funds will
be forced into liquidation.
Typically, shares of a fund are purchased through authorized dealers who have
entered into sales agreements with the distributor or underwriter of the shares of the
fund. Shares are offered at net asset value plus a reducing sales load for quantity pur-







Less than $15,000 8.75% 8.00%
$15,000, but less than $25,000 8.00% 7.50%
$25,000, but less than $50,000 7.00% 6.25%
$50,000, but less than $125,000 5.00% 4.25%
$125,000, but less than $250,000 3.00% 2.25%
$250,000, and over 2.00% 1.40%
10 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(3) (1970).
11 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 89 (Mar. 13, 1941). The SEC recently
called attention to the fact that the sales charges set forth in the prospectus and the
"real" sales charge may in effect differ:
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this uniformity was essential because section 22(d) prohibited dis-
crimination among investors. Yet, in the wake of this opinion and two
companion releases of the SEC, which approved cumulative volume
discounts" and discounts based on the total sales of several related
funds made to one investor at the same time,' investment companies
proceeded to interpret the single investment requirement in such a
way as to permit an artificial grouping of investors. Such interpreta-
tions of course resulted in various groups of individuals receiving dis-
criminatory discounts. At the same time, the SEC was granting
numerous exemptions from the prohibitions of section 22(d), under
section 6(c)." It was soon perceived that, unless further steps were
taken to clarify the situation, section 22(d) would be interpreted or
exempted out of existence, thus returning the industry to a pre-1940
situation.
A. Rule 22d- 1
In view of the increasing number of interpretations permitting
artificial groupings, the SEC considered whether volume discounts to
artificially created groups constituted price discrimination among cus-
tomers. In concluding that the grouping of investors to achieve volume
discounts was contrary to the statutory purpose of section 22(d),"
the SEC adopted Rule 22d-1,16 which prohibits groups (with the
exception of a close family group, a single trust, or single fiduciary
account and certain pension and profit sharing plans) from taking
advantage of volume discounts. This prohibition was accomplished by
['Me practice of compensating broker-dealers for mutual fund sales by assigning
them commission business violates the long accepted precept in investment com-
pany regulation that an investor is entitled to know how much was paid to those
who sell him an investment. This practice puts the investment company in the
position of issuing a prospectus which purports to specify the sales compensation
but fails to quantify the additional compensation paid to the customer's broker-
dealer in the form of commission business awarded on the basis of success in
selling investment company shares.
SEC Policy Statement, The Future Structure of the Securities Markets 42-43 (Feb. 3,
1972).
IS Investors Diversified Services, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 1504
(Aug. 15, 1950)•
la Axe Houghton Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 1505 (Aug.
17, 1950).
14 Section 6(c) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. I; 80a-6(c) (1970), provides that the
Commission by rule, regulation or order may exempt any person or transaction or any
class of persons or transactions from any provision of the Act if and to the extent that
such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the
protection of investors and purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of the
Act. According to Greene, supra note 6, at 377-79, most funds considered aggregate pur-
chases to be single transactions and thus automatically qualifying for a quantity discount
without need for an exemptive order under § 6(c).
15 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1 (1971).
15 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2798 (Dec. 2, 1958).
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limiting volume discounts to "any person" and, subject to the specified
exceptions, specifically providing that the term "any person"
shall not include a group of individuals whose funds are com-
bined, directly or indirectly, for the purchase of redeemable
securities of a registered investment company jointly or
through a trustee, agent, custodian, or other representative,
nor shall it include a trustee, agent, custodian, or other repre-
sentative of such a group of individuals."
In discussing this restrictive provision, the SEC observed that
recognition of such artificial groupings violated the purpose and intent
of section 22 (d) because of the resultant price discrimination." In
determining whether such groupings were entitled to discounts, how-
ever, the SEC apparently did not consider whether the dealer provided
sales services such as advertising, the distribution of sales literature
and other selling efforts; rather, the SEC focused on the composition
of the groups. By including the definition of "any person" within
the Rule, the SEC, in effect, decided that ad hoc buying cooperatives
did not qualify.
Since the adoption of Rule 22d-1, the SEC on a number of occa-
sions has reaffirmed its stand against discrimination among purchasers
of investment company shares." In denying an application for an
exemption from section 22(d) based on an artificial grouping of insur-
ance purchasers, the SEC stated:
The general role of this Commission under the statutes we
administer is to secure for public investors maximum pro-
tections in the purchase and sale of securities, and it might
seem that it is not in furtherance of that role for us to pre-
vent an issuer of securities which desires to permit some
investors to obtain its securities without sales charges or
with low charges from doing so. An important objective of
section 22 (d), the provisions of which were first suggested by
members of the industry, is to prevent discrimination or
preferential treatment in prices."
Continued SEC intent to prevent price discrimination was evi-
denced by the failure of the SEC to adopt a proposed revision of
Rule 22d-1 that would have substituted for the above quoted definition
of "any person" the definition set forth in Section 2(a) (28) of the
11
 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1(a) (1971).
18 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2718 (May 29, 1958).
19 See, e.g., Midamerica Mutual Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 3612 (Jan. 11, 1963). See also Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 829
(1960).
20 Midamerica Mutual Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3612
at 3 (Jan. 11, 1963).
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1940 Act. 2 ' Under this section, the proposed definition would have
included a "company," a term defined in Section 2(a) (8) of the 1940
Act as including "any organized group of persons whether incor-
porated or not."" A stated purpose of this proposed revision was to
"afford quantity discounts to groups of individuals."' Apparently, the
SEC was hesitant to encourage the formation of buying cooperatives
organized for the express purpose of purchasing mutual fund shares.
It should be recognized, however, that such groups remain eligible for
a section 6(c) exemption based on reduced selling efforts.
B. Rule 22d-1 (h)
Current SEC approval of the purposes behind section 22(d) is
evidenced by a recently adopted amendment to Rule 22d-1(h) which
restricts the class of persons entitled to a reduction or elimination of
sales charges.24 Prior to the amendment, Rule 22d-1(h) permitted the
reduction or elimination of sales loads for several classes of persons
both related and unrelated to the functions of the company, its invest-
ment adviser or principal underwriter." This amendment, which was
adopted "[i]n view of the proliferation of insurance companies and
21 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5507 (Oct. 7, 1968). See SEC "no
action" letter to Westfield Growth Fund, Inc., (May 21, 1971), where a co-mingled trust
account having a substantial amount of other investments was allowed to purchase fund
shares at reduced sales charges for quantity purchases. This letter was written in connec-
tion with Release No. 5507, according to which the term "any person" would have been
modified so as not to include a trustee or the participants in a co-mingled trust account.
LA summary copy of this letter, prepared by the Investment Co. Institute, is on , file in
the office of the Boston College Industrial & Commercial Law Review].
22
 Section 2(a) (28) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(28) (1970), provides that
"qp]erson' means a natural person or a company." "Company" is defined in § 2(a) (8)
of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (8) (1970), as including "a corporation ... a fund,
or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not."
23
 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5507, at 1 (Oct. 7, 1968).
24
 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6347 (Feb. 8, 1971).
25
 Prior to promulgation of SEC Release No. 6347, id., a liberal application of Rule
22d-1(h) was given by the SEC in several cases. In Transamerica Capital Fund, SEC
Investment Company Act Release Nos. 5730 (July 1, 1969), and 5751 (July 25, 1969),
the SEC permitted special pricing for almost 23,000 persons employed by the Trans-
america conglomerate, without issuing an opinion providing the reasons for its decision.
It is doubtful that any investment company purpose was served by providing special
prices to persons who were employed by over 100 subsidiaries of Transamerica. See also
Travelers Equities Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5948 (Jan.
3, 1970), where an exemption was granted for sales at net asset value, without sales
charge, to persons in the following categories: (1) permanent employees of the Travelers
Companies having more than one year's service and over the age of 21, and all officers
and directors of the Travelers Companies and of the Fund; (2) contract sales representa-
tives of the Travelers Companies; and (3) full-time employees of such representatives
serving more than one year and over the age of 21, and any trust, pension or profit-
sharing, or any other benefit plan for such persons. After SEC Release No. 6347 was
promulgated, the SEC adopted a more restrictive approach in denying the general counsel
of an open-end investment company the right to purchase shares of the fund at net
asset value. Wisconsin Fund, Inc., 2 CCH Mutual Funds Guide § 9290 (Aug. 3, 1971).
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conglomerate complexes in the investment company industry," serves
to limit the availability of fund sales charge discounts to those em-
ployees of an adviser and seller who devote, or who may potentially
devote, "more than one-half of ttheir] working time" to the company
on whose shares they are obtaining a discount.'" One objection raised
to the amendment, but given little serious consideration, involved the
difficulty which would arise in determining the manner by which to
measure "more than one-half." Another objection focused on the
problem that arises where a life insurance company acts as investment
adviser and principal underwriter for two or more registered separate
accounts or mutual funds; this objection, however, was met by per-
mitting satisfaction of the one-half working time standard in situations
in which a person has rendered his services to more than one fund
within a complex. In adopting the amended rule the SEC stated:
It is important to note that this rule and the present
amendment are necessitated by Section 22(d) of the Act,
which was not changed by the recent amendments to the Act
in Public Law 91-547. 27
It is curious to observe that in proposing to redefine the words
"any person" in Rule 22d-1, 28 the SEC planned to enlarge the number
of groups entitled to volume discounts, while in amending Rule
22d-1(h)," the SEC reversed itself and restricted the class of persons
entitled to a reduction or elimination of the sales charge. In the latter
situation, the persons to which the discount is available work directly
or indirectly for a common employer, and a reduced or possibly non-
existent sales cost should justify a reduction in the sales charge. Ob-
viously, then, it is not the amount of sales effort upon which the SEC
now relies in affording sales cost reductions, but rather the structure
of the group itself. This distinction will be discussed further in rela-
tion to recent SEC findings involving Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc.
II. THE DECISION IN MUTUAL FUNDS ADVISORY, INC.
In a recent application for an exemption" under Section 6(c) of
the 1940 Act, Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc. (MFA), a broker-dealer
registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), proposed to sell to The Fundpack, Inc. (Fundpack), a
registered open-end investment company under common control with
20 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6347, at 2, 4 (Feb. 8, 1971).
27 Id , at 3.
28
 See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5507 (Oct. 7, 1968).
29 See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6347 (Feb. 8, 1971).
3° Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6932
(Jan. 12, 1972).
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MFA, shares of load mutual funds at MFA's cost—i.e., the net asset
value plus the concession to the principal underwriter of the selling
fund. Fundpack had invested only in no-load funds, but it.proposed to
invest in load fund shares and to operate as a fund holding company.
Under section 22(d), MFA as a dealer would be prohibited from sell-
ing mutual fund shares to Fundpack except at the current public
offering price, including a concession for the dealer as a part of the
sales load. In order for MFA to sell shares to Fundpack without
charging Fundpack the dealer's concession, MFA had to obtain an
exemption, pursuant to section 6(c), from the provisions of section
22 (d) .31
Arguments concerning the philosophy and application of section
22(d) were dramatically presented in briefs filed by MFA, the NASD,
the Investment Company Institute (ICI) and the SEC's Division of
Corporate Regulation (SEC Corp. Reg.).32
 MFA argued that the
exemption would be in the public interest, because of the resulting
economies in portfolio transactions, and that the SEC had consistently
taken into account the presence or absence of substantial services
performed by the dealer. In this regard, MFA argued that the acquisi-
tion of load fund shares for the portfolio of Fundpack would not
require MFA to perform the same type of services that it must per-
form in selling mutual fund shares to the public." If MFA's rationale
is accepted, the question arises as to whether a dealer's concession is
justified where any unsolicited order of investment company shares is
involved. It is evident that if an exemption were allowed on the basis
of reduced services performed by MFA, the extent of the services
performed by any dealer as a prerequisite to a section 22(d) exemp-
31
 The application by MFA also contained a request for a § 6(c) exemption from
the provisions of 17(a), which prohibits transactions between an investment company
and an affiliated person. 15 U.S.C. § 80-17(a) (1970). Section 17(a) was designed to protect
mutual funds and their shareholders from overreaching, by prohibiting, among other
transactions, the purchase of securities from an affiliate when the affiliate acts as a
principal. Id.
32
 Briefs of Applicant for Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc. (Jan. 27, 1971) [hereinafter
cited as MFA Brief]; Brief of the Division of Corporate Regulations (Feb. 5, 1971) [here-
inafter cited as SEC Corp. Reg. Brief]; Brief of the Investment Company Institute (Mar.
8, 1971) [hereinafter cited as ICI Brief]; Brief of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc, (Mar. 22, 1971) [hereinafter cited as NASD Brief]; Mutual Funds Advisory,
Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6932 (Jan. 12, 1972). Copies of these
Briefs are on file at the Library of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington,
D.C.
33 See MFA Brief, supra note 32, at 27-30. The NASD, citing Midamerica Mutual
Fund, Inc. (SEC Investment Company Release No. 3612, Jan. II, 1963), took exception
to the broad statement made by MFA that the SEC has consistently taken into account
the presence or absence of substantial services in ruling on proposed exemptions from
§ 22(d). NASD Brief, supra note 32 at 31.
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tion would probably have to be resolved in a time-consuming case by
case analysis.
SEC Corp. Reg., in support of MFA's application, argued that
the sale to Fundpack of redeemable securities at a price lower than
that which other individuals must pay would not disrupt the distribu-
tion channels for particular mutual fund shares. In support of its
position, SEC Corp. Reg. alluded to the broad range of exemptive
orders which had been granted by the SEC on the basis of reduced or
nonexistent sales costs.34 However, SEC Corp. Reg. failed to note that
the cases it cited had concerned exemptions granted to the specific
funds involved and that the exemptions had benefitted persons directly
related to the fund itself; whereas in MFA's situation, one member of
a group of dealers selling the shares of a fund was asking for a reduc-
tion in the sales load.
In rejecting the MFA and SEC Corp. Reg. positions, the NASD
asserted that an exemption would place Fundpack in a preferred posi-
tion, one not obtainable by any other member of the public, and that it
would thus discriminate in favor of one customer—all contrary to the
intent of section 22(d). The NASD asserted that "Fundpack or any
other institution ... are 'customers' the same as members of the gen-
eral public or the so-called 'man in the street' investing only $10 per
month," and that " [t] here is no way the 'man in the street' can pur-
chase mutual fund shares at a lower price other than the ordinary vol-
ume discount which is also available to Fundpack without the
exemption."'" The NASD claimed that because the exemption was in
the interest of only Fundpack or its shareholders, it did not meet the
requirement of section 6(c) that it be necessary or in the public
interest. The NASD further argued that it was MFA's burden to prove
that the granting of the exemption would not disrupt the orderly dis-
tribution of fund shares.°° In contrast, SEC. Corp. Reg. argued that
the SEC has granted exemptions from section 22(d) which permitted
discrimination among investors and which did not result in a disrup-
tion of the fund distribution system."
Finally, the ICI in its brief stressed that section 22(d) did not
permit the sale of shares of registered investment companies to Fund-
pack at a discount because Fundpack is an unauthorized grouping of
34 See SEC Corp. Reg. Brief, supra note 32, at 13-14. But see Midarnerica Mutual
Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3612 (Jan. 11, 1963), •where the
SEC reaffirmed its stand against discrimination among purchasers of mutual fund shares.
36 NASD Brief, supra note 32, at 24.
88 Id. at 25.
87 SEC Corp. Reg. Brief, supra note 32, at 13, n.32.
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customers organized in violation of Rule 22d-1. 88 This argument was
based on the fact that the SEC had failed to adopt a proposed revision
of Rule 22d-1 which would have permitted groups of customers to
qualify for quantity discounts." The ICI argument, however, would
deny investors reduced sales loads for quantity purchases when they
purchased shares of a fund organized for the purpose of acquiring
shares of other funds. The fact that Congress now specifically permits,
within certain limitations, the operations of such fund holding com-
panies,4° appears to rebut the ICI argument that the grouping of
MFA's customers into an investment company entity is artificial and
ineligible for a volume discount. The better argument would have been
to consider the grouping of MFA's customers as being legitimate, but
to interpret section 22(d) as requiring Fundpack to purchase shares
of other load funds on the basis of the same quantity discounts
granted to other customers.
On January 12, 1972, the SEC denied MFA's application for the
exemption.4 I The SEC determined that, because MFA had served as a
broker and not a dealer in acquiring the shares of other funds for
Fundpack's portfolio, MFA lacked standing to seek an exemption
from section 22(d). The opinion indicated that only underwriters of
funds whose shares were to be acquired for Fundpack had standing. 42
The opinion, however, noted that even if the application had properly
been brought before the SEC, it would have failed because the pur-
poses of section 22(d) would be defeated." In discussing the possible
disruption in the distribution of fund shares that could result from the
offering of discounts to investors, the SEC showed little sympathy for
MFA's contention that Congress had intended to foster the creation
of fund holding companies by permitting them to obtain preferential
prices in purchasing fund shares for their portfolios." The opinion also
emphasized the fact that dealers selling shares of other funds would
soon find themselves at a competitive disadvantage because Fundpack
could purchase these same shares at a lower price and then, in effect,
88
 See ICI Brief, supra note 32, at 10-14.
39
 See discussion of SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5507 (Oct. 7, 1968).
40 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1) (1970) prohibits a fund of funds from acquiring more
than 3% of the shares of another investment company, confines sales charges imposed
upon the public by such funds to 1.5%, and restricts the number of shares of portfolio
investment companies that can be redeemed.
41 Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6932
(Jan. 12, 1972).
42 Id. at 3. The SEC ruled that the concessions or rebates paid to MFA would be
subject to 15 IJS.C. § 80a-17(e)(2) (1970), which makes it unlawful for a person affiliated
with a registered investment company who is "acting as a broker" in connection with the
sale of securities to such company to receive from any source a commission or other
remuneration which exceeds 1% of the purchase price. Id.
43 Id, at 4.
44 Id.
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offer the investor an indirect discount through sales to him of shares of
Fundpack."
MFA's contention that a reduction in selling costs has been the
basis for the granting of prior exemptions was summarily dismissed by
the SEC on the grounds that "Rule 22d-1 was designed not only to
codify but also to eliminate or modify exemptions from Section 22(d)
previously granted, and we have since materially restricted the class
of persons eligible for preferential prices under the Rule."' Although
this statement appears to support the proposition that section 22(d) is
primarily concerned with eliminating discrimination among purchasers,
the SEC did not go so far as to adopt the NASD contention that the
applicant for an exemption has the burden of proving that an exemp-
tion would not disrupt the orderly distribution of fund shares.' The
opinion indicates that restrictions imposed by section 22(d) should be
applied regardless of whether the purchaser is an individual or an
entity organized specifically to invest in shares of other funds. An im-
portant consequence of this position is that a fund affiliated with a
dealer does not gain economic advantage over an unrelated fund since
each becomes entitled to a discount only if qualifying dollar purchases
are made."
If the SEC had granted an exemption to MFA, it would be diffi-
cult to restrain dealers similarly situated from entering into contracts
to rebate or give up a part of their dealers' concession to an unrelated
fund. Fund holding companies would then purchase shares of funds
from only those dealers who would give up the greatest proportion of
their dealers' concessions. As a result, the suitability and investment
merit of the fund shares purchased would no longer be the prime
selling factors—a consequence which would be to the detriment of the
shareholders of the holding companies. Eventually, too, by dealing
directly with the principal underwriter of the fund, the fund complexes
would promote the demise of the dealer; new dealer compensation
46 Id.
46
 Id. at 5.
47
 NASD Brief, supra note 32, at 25,
48
 In regard to the situation involving the rebate by a mutual fund salesman to his
public customers of a portion of the sales load, the SEC has stated:
Moreover, the purposes of Section 22(d) as stated by the Commission "arc to
prevent discrimination among purchasers and to provide for orderly distribution
of such shares by preventing their sale at a price less than that fixed in the
prospectus." (citation omitted). Accordingly, while [the salesman's] customers
were financially benefitted in their particular purchases from him, Section 22(d)
seeks to prevent the adverse effect upon investors generally which would result
from discriminatory pricing and disorderly distribution.
Spiro Sideris d/b/a Olympic Insurance and Securities Agency, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8816 at 2 (Feb. 13, 1970). Article III, § 24 of the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice prohibits the granting of a discount by a broker-dealer to a customer. CCH
NASD Manual § 2174 (1971).
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arrangements would have to be created to encourage sales of the fund
of funds to the public shareholder. Whatever the final result, it is safe
to predict that most of the problems involving sales charges (except as
provided in Section 12(d) (1) of the 1940 Act) would reappeai at
another level or in another form in the distribution structure.
It is apparent from a close examination of the opinion in the MFA
application that the SEC was not about to "rock the boat" until its
study concerning the amendment or deletion of section 22(d) had
been completed. The SEC realized that the granting of an exemption
to MFA would prematurely have precipitated tidal waves throughout
the industry. Thus it is not inconceivable that the SEC might have
reached an opposite conclusion if its study of section 22(d) had been
completed before consideration of the MFA application. In any event,
the SEC appropriately decided to wait for congressional action before
attempting to modify the retail price maintenance provisions of section
22 (d).
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE 1970 ACT
AMENDMENTS
It is important to note that Congress did not alter the thrust of
section 22(d) in the 1970 Act amendments. Legislative proposals had
been made to abolish section 22(d) and to place maximum upper limits
on sales loads, but testimony at the hearings convinced Congress that
a sufficient study of the consequences of such an amendment had not
been made. As a result, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
asked the SEC to review the consequences of deleting section 22(d)
from the Act and to report its recommendations to the Committee."
Having thus declined to abolish the retail price maintenance pro-
vision of section 22(d), Congress approached the sales charge problem
from the sales loads perspective, by passing a series of amendments to
section 22 (b)—the section which authorizes the NASD to adopt rules
regulating sales loads. Prior to the amendments the standard used by
the NASD in adopting such rules was one of preventing an "uncon-
scionable or grossly excessive sales load."" Section 22 (b) now provides
that the public offering price of fund shares must not include an "ex-
cessive sales load," with a stipulation that sales loads shall "allow for
a reasonable compensation for sales personnel, broker-dealers, and
underwriters and for reasonable sales loads to investors."" It would
49
 S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
bo Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686 tit. I § 22, 54 Stat. 823.
51 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1970), § 12(b)(1) of the 1970 Act, amends 22(b) of
the 1940 Act. S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 18 (1969) indicates that:
The provision for "reasonable loads to investors" is intended to assure that the
sales loads fixed by the principal underwriters (which continue to be protected
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appear that this provision would sanction higher sales loads in situa-
tions where relatively more selling effort is involved.
The amendments to section 22 (b) must have been based on the
premise, as stated by the SEC in its 1966 Report, that the then current
sales charges were excessive, a conclusion perhaps arbitrarily reached."
In a letter to the NASD, dated April 29, 1966, the SEC's Division of
Trading and Markets admitted that, with respect to the securities
industry generally, there exists "a pressing and unfilled need for addi-
tional financial data to assist the Commission as well as the self-
regulatory institutions in the performance of their responsibilities.”"
The letter further stated that it was impossible for the SEC to dis-
charge its responsibility without the benefit of additional financial data
from each firm in the securities industry:
It is well known that there are many interrelationships
between the exchange markets, the over-the-counter markets
and other aspects of the securities industry, such as under-
writing of new issues and the distribution of mutual fund
shares. The emphasis placed on each area of activity depends
basically on its profitability, on the circumstances of the
particular firm, and also upon the applicable regulatory re-
quirements and responsibilities. Without information, there is
no means of measuring the impact of changes in regulatory
procedures applicable to each of these activities, whether
such changes will result in significant changes of emphasis
without the industry and whether, if so, this is a good thing,
a bad thing, or neither. The problems of the next decade are
extremely difficult and mistakes cannot afford to be made or
decisions taken randomly {sic], under threat of law suit or
exercise of economic pressures. The Commission has the
responsibility for acting in the public interest; it will also be
in the role of arbiter, and neither we nor the self-regulatory
organizations can work in a vacuum.'
In commenting on this letter, the ICI questioned whether there existed
against price competition by Section 22(d) of the Act) will be established at
levels which recognize the interests of investors. These provisions also contem-
plate that, if warranted, the rules might include provisions for higher sales loads
in situations where relatively more selling effort is required. They will also per-
mit flexible treatment of the problem of sales loads on automatic investment of
dividends, which involve little or no new effort.
52 House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the SEC on the
Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPI]. This Report is discussed in Simpson
and Hodes, supra note 6, at 723.
58 Letter from the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets to NASD, April 29, 1966,
quoted at p. 6 of the memorandum attached to letter from Dorsey Richardson, President
of ICI, to the SEC, Sept. 12, 1966.
54 Id.
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any reason consistent with the public interest or the protection of in-
vestors supporting the adoption of new legislation affecting methods
of mutual fund share distribution. ICI further charged that any such
legislation altering section 22(d) "would not be based on fact but on
theoretical economic concepts."' Today, six years after this exchange
of letters, it appears that the SEC is finally collecting the economic
data upon which to base its recommendation to the Congress.
IV. CURRENT STUDIES
A. The NASD Study Pertaining to Section 22(b)
At present, the NASD is soliciting information from its members
which it will evaluate in adopting rules defining and prohibiting exces-
sive sales charges." In the formulation of rules concerning excessive
sales loads, consideration must be given to the nature and quality of
services necessary to effect the proper distribution of fund shares to the
public. Thus funds which lack their own sales forces must be allowed
to make sales commissions attractive in order to encourage fund deal-
ers to sell their shares. These funds are protected to the extent that the
SEC, upon application, could grant qualified exemptions from the sales
load provisions to smaller companies which experience relatively
higher operating costs." Responsibility for the adoption of rules pro-
hibiting excessive mutual fund sales charges rests with existing self-
regulatory machinery (at present the NASD is the only such vehicle),
subject to appropriate SEC overview." Section 22(b) (3), which
changes the rule-making authority of the SEC formerly contained in
Section 22(c) of the 1940 Act, now provides that eighteen months after
55 Letter from Dorsey Richardson to the SEC, Sept. 12, 1966, at p. 7 of attached
memorandum.
55 On April 30, 1971, the NASD mailed questionnaires to NASD principal under-
writers and NASD broker-dealers, and accommodated the SEC by simultaneously mailing
the section 22(d) questionnaires prepared by the SEC staff. According to the general
instructions which accompanied the NASD questionnaires, the data obtained will be used
by NASD consultant Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., in conducting an economic study upon
which the NASD may establish, pursuant to the 1970 amendment to Section 22(b) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, guidelines for sales charges on redeemable securities
issued by a registered investment company and sold to the public. These guidelines will
be intended to insure that the price "shall not include an excessive sales load but shall
allow for reasonable compensation for sales personnel, broker-dealers, and underwriters,
and for reasonable sales loads to investors."
57 Section 12(a) of the 1970 Act amends Section 22(b)(1) of the 1940 Act by adding
protective language in regard to smaller companies.
58 The NASD has already established a maximum of 5% on commissions to be
charged in over-the-counter transactions, but this rule does not have any application to
sales of mutual fund shares. See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, 4, known as
the "NASD Mark-up Policy." CCH NASD Manual II 2154 (1971). It has been suggested
by the SEC that the 5% policy could be a passible starting point for determining proper
sales loads. See PPI, supra note 52, at 22. See also The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal
Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer, 732, 847-48 (1969), for a more detailed discussion.
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the date of its enactment (June 14, 1972) or sooner if the NASD has
adopted the required rules, the SEC may supplement or change these
NASD rules as authorized by Section 15A(k) (2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934."
B. The SEC Study Pertaining to Section 22(d)
In the meantime, in an effort to study the impact of a repeal of
section 22(d), the SEC has prepared and transmitted questionnaires
to broker-dealers, principal underwriters and mutual funds. The SEC
inquiry relating to broker-dealers seeks to determine the number of
people actually involved in the selling of fund shares and the extent of
the salesmen's income attributable to that activity. In addition, the
SEC is seeking information from broker-dealer firms regarding the
relative importance of mutual fund business to the firms themselves
and the expenses attributable to selling fund shares.
The SEC questionnaires also include a list of seventeen funds that
have discontinued the public offering of shares and that do not have a
current prospectus." Shares of these funds may be purchased in the
over-the-counter market, where the purchase price is not governed by
the price maintenance provisions of section 22(d). By eliciting sales
information from broker-dealers who handle transactions in either
a principal or agency capacity, the SEC is attempting to determine
what mark-ups, mark-downs or commissions are charged in a market-
place not regulated by section 22(d). Such information would be
revealing if these broker-dealers traded fund shares only over-the-
counter; since, however, these same broker-dealers distribute fund
shares in accordance with section 22(d), it is questionable whether the
over-the-counter operations can be meaningfully segregated and ana-
lyzed from a profit standpoint.
The questionnaire sent to the principal underwriters, which posed
many of the same questions asked of broker-dealers, also inquired into
the number of investment companies the underwriter represented, the
number of dealers distributing shares of the fund represented by the
underwriter, and the types of investment plans being offered by the
underwriter. After the SEC receives this information it will try to
determine what comparative effect the abolition of section 22(d) would
have on (1) underwriters who confine their operations to wholesaling
and who use independent brokers for retailing, and (2) underwriters
who have their own retail sales organizations, called "captive sales
59 15 U.S.C. 1 80a-22(b) (3) (1970).
6° See pages 6-8 of the SEC Broker-Dealer 22(d) Questionnaire, Pt. B (Mar, 1971),
where the SEC requests data relating to inventories and transactions in shares of 17
listed funds during the two-week period ending December 31, 1970. A copy of these pages
is on file in the office of the Boston College Industrial & Commercial Law Review.
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forces." The statistics will probably show that the underwriter employ-
ing a captive sales force is not as vulnerable to the vast economic lever-
age that a large national brokerage firm can wield in negotiating a
reduction in the underwriter/wholesaler's sales concession. The result
may well be that the large national brokerage firm rather than the
underwriter/wholesaler will be in a position to determine the ultimate
public offering price of fund shares; this situation, in, turn, will create
competition for the underwriters owning captive sales forces. Instead
of funds and their underwriters offering competitive sales loads to at-
tract shareholders (which is now the case), the abolition of section
22 (d) would shift the competition to lower sales charges to the retailers
and distributors of fund shares. It is doubtful that the statistics pres-
ently being collected will reveal the extent of the financial impact that
elimination of section 22(d) would have on fund underwriters.
Finally, the questionnaire sent to the funds focused on the
methods used to merchandise fund shares, the extent of redemptions,
the magnitude of the sales effort, and the geographical distribution of
the shares. In requesting fund sales data, the SEC seeks specific infor-
mation regarding sales loads charged, dealer concessions offered and
the "break-points" designated for varying sales charges. This informa-
tion should enable the SEC to evaluate the relationship between the
size of the purchases and the sales load charged. However, since most
funds presently have sales loads of one percent or less on purchases of
one million dollars or more,6' it is doubtful that quantity discounts
based on large group purchases will be negotiated at rates substantially
less than those now charged even if section 22(d) were eliminated.
CONCLUSION
It is possible that the conclusions of the SEC investigation con-
cerning the impact of deleting section 22(d) and the NASD study of
section 22 (b) aimed at adopting rules defining and prohibiting sales
loads considered "excessive" will conflict. The NASD might adopt
guidelines defining excessive sales loads within the framework of sec-
tion 22(d) while at the same time the SEC might recommend that
mutual funds must not be permitted to control the public sale price of
their shares. Without the protective pricing practices of section 22(d),
dealer price-cutting would likely undermine the NASD sales loads
guidelines by forcing many smaller dealers out of business. Such a
development would be violative of the mandate of section 22(b), which
presently provides that reasonable compensation shall be allowed for
sales personnel, broker-dealers, and underwriters." Moreover, it can be
61 PPI supra note 52, at 210.
62 15 U.S.C. 80a-22(b) (1970).
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argued that Congress sanctioned protective pricing practices by ex-
pressly removing the SEC's authority to shield such practices from
possible antitrust attack.
At issue in both the SEC and NASD studies is the extent of the
financial loss which would be experienced by the fund industry if
section 22(d) were abolished. It is doubtful, however, that the figures
which are likely to emerge from these studies will measure accurately
the financial repercussions of price competition. Even if meaningful
figures do emerge, the statistics will. be  interpreted in many ways to
support a variety of conclusions, especially in a situation where no
guidelines have been determined at the outset. It will be interesting to
observe whether the statistics which are ultimately presented by the
SEC will have any significant effect on the fundamental public policy
issue—whether or not there should be competition in the sale of mutual
fund shares.
If one takes into consideration the competing interests and the vari-
ous consequences that might arise from the limitation or expansion of
the pertinent sections, it would seem that a comprehensive package plan
is necessary. Such a solution would attempt to reach a workable and
realistic compromise among the various interest groups. In the opinion
of this writer, section 22 (d) should be retained in order to insure the
continued smooth functioning of the distribution system. As noted
above, disruptions in the system jeopardize the viability of mutual
funds and ultimately work to the detriment of the investor. Because
the very provisions of section 22(d) which protect the purchaser's
investment also work to his disadvantage, by precluding the price
benefits of open competition, additional measures are necessary to
complement section 22 (d). A modification of Rule 22d-1 to allow a
wider range of investors to become members of groups eligible for
volume discounts would be an initial step in this direction. Second, an
across-the-board upper limit of 6.5-7.5 percent for sales charges would
insure that sales loads remain at least reasonable, if not competitive.
Finally, adoption of a new, lower "first break-point" in the range of six
percent for purchases exceeding $7,500 would ease the present high
sales load levied on smaller investments.
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